The ‘Summer of Discontent’: Exclusion and Communal Resistance at the London 2012 Olympics

Highlights

1) Identifies how event zones exclude small business access to Olympic tourism
2) Draws on de Certeau’s concept of project ‘strategies’ and local ‘tactics’
3) Identifies and conceptualises ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ resistance tactics used at the local level
4) Argues that proactivity, as opposed to reactivity, is vital for ‘communal resistance’
5) Produces ‘tactics for resistance’ to inspire early resistance and access to mega-event visitor economies.

Abstract

London 2012 promised local small businesses access to lucrative Olympic event-tourism and visitor trading opportunities. However, as urban spaces were transformed to stage live Games, many local stakeholders found themselves locked out. We focus on one ‘host’ community, Central Greenwich, who emerged negatively impacted by such conditions. 43 in-depth interviews and secondary evidence reveal that this was a community determined to resist. Few papers have extended the concept of resistance to the context of mega-events so we examine why communities resisted, and how physical tactics and creative resistance were deployed. Although efforts afforded some access for local businesses - they proved too little, too late. We present the ‘tactics for resistance’, a series of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tactics businesses could use to encourage proactive, as opposed to reactive, communal resistance required to protect local interests and afford access to opportunities generated by temporary mega-event visitor economies.

Keywords: Communal resistance, Exclusion, Small businesses, Hard and soft tactics, Host community, Mega-event, Olympic tourism, London 2012.

1. Introduction

Mega-events are complex projects that exist and flourish by garnering significant political-economic support from the upper echelons of government, quasi and non-governmental bodies (NGOs) (Chalip, 2017). They epitomise the conscious effort made by sports policy and senior managers to catalyse new and existing urban policies and projects. Large-scale development
projects, like the Olympics, are by and large a ‘choice development strategy’ (Broudehoux and Sanchez, 2015) - cities do not have to bid and host them. Years, if not decades, of meticulous planning go into preparing a bid, with national organisations like the British Olympic Association (BOA) in the UK requiring a mandate from central governments to submit an application. However, the efficacy of such projects to achieve initial well-intended objectives have been questioned, and critiqued, and a number of hopeful host cities now seek referendum-like approval from their citizens before bidding (Dempsey and Zimbalist, 2017). This activity has, however, illuminated the extent of public resistance against the Olympics, where strident international (e.g. DemocracyNow (2018), GamesMonitor (2018), RioonWatch, (2018)) and national campaigns, like ‘NOlympia’ in both Munich and Hamburg and ‘No Boston Olympics’, have successfully sought to veto government attempts to host (see CityLab, 2017 for a detailed case).

For cities successful in securing the rights to host, a constellation of sports, policy, private and public bodies and interests adjoin to execute a project that will significantly impact, and disrupt, the day-to-day lives of individuals and collective organisations within and beyond the chosen host city. This is particularly so for those situated within close proximity of neighbourhood spaces officially chosen to play host. In the preceding decades, and certainly since the turn of the 21st century, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and national organising committees (NOCs) have placed extensive emphasis on social and economic regeneration and development at the heart of project objectives – as both an immediate outcome and a longer-term so-called ‘legacy’ (see Olympic 2020 agenda – IOC, 2018). Positive developmental outcomes intertwine inextricably with moral virtues extolled within the ‘Olympic Movement’ itself and inscribed into the ‘Olympic Charter’. The IOC’s overarching aim: to herald a vision of ‘respect for universal fundamental ethical principles (…) banishing any form of discrimination with regard to a country or person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender, or otherwise which is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic movement’ (IOC, 2013: 54). Yet, Zimbalist (2015) argues that little evidence suggests the Games has served to end or suspend hostility between nations or to improve the relationships between national governments and their populaces – in fact, quite the contrary.

Aptly, conflict of an ideological, political, social and economic nature emerges as a direct result of the rather extraordinary conditions that typify the multifaceted unequal developmental effects of mega-events (OECD, 2008). Theoretically, such projects have the power to
‘orientate’, ‘connect’ and ‘integrate’ global (and local) communities (Horne and Manzenreiter, 2006). However, numerous authors argue that they exacerbate conflict and division within the host city (Raco and Tunney, 2010). As a result, the ability and efficacy by which mega-events achieve reasonable and [well] distributed developmental benefits is questionable (Viehoff and Poynter, 2015). Critical economic geographers like Harvey (1989) argue that entrepreneurial projects, speculative in nature with little evidence of positive social and economic returns on investment, serve to divert public attention and funds away from fundamental socio-economic challenges in the neoliberal city. Zimbalist (2015) claims that mega-events are an ‘economic gamble’ that excludes individuals and communities without the social and economic capital to participate and leverage such an opportunity. Effectively, they favour those with the influence and power to participate (e.g. Horne, 2007), and disserve those less visible who do not (Raco and Tunney, 2010).

Emphasis on certain intended ‘desired’ outcomes may serve as a ‘smoke and mirror’ effect (Garcia, 2004), or perhaps a placebo (Rojek, 2014) that conceals parochial interests (McGillivray and Frew, 2015). Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) argue that a rhetoric of positive local inclusion, community participation and developmental outcomes may simply serve to justify the event and help negate resistance efforts across the host nation, city and soon to be official event zones. Yet, empirical evidence points to the way such projects may favour a narrow sub-section of society - namely those interests that align and intertwine with those who wish to profit from the Olympics’ occurrence (Raco and Tunney, 2010). As such, it can be argued that project plans are drawn up embodying the ‘sectional interests’ of more desirable, prosperous and upwardly mobile citizens (e.g. large-scale business owners and property developers) considered ‘synonymous with the well-being of the city’, speaking on behalf of their fellow citizens (Gruneau, 2002: 9-10). McGillivray and Frew (2015) therefore question the foundational ethical principles of mega-events, and the actions of their policy makers and project managers as a far cry from the principled, virtuous departercularised moral positionality projected by the Olympic Movement and Charter. Following the Sydney 2000 Games Vigor et al (2004) stated that the Games has seen a progressively ‘fundamental change in philosophy’ (2004: 5). We argue, and our empirical analysis suggests that such change represents an on-going focus toward commercial logic and profit maximisation, whereby mega-events simultaneously step back away from (particularly locally rooted) social responsibilities and offer an illusion of inclusivity.
Brazil’s 2014 FIFA World Cup and Rio’s 2016 Olympics illustrated such challenges (e.g. Vox, 2016). South America’s Olympic project received notable media and academic criticism, alongside urban protestation found across the city, in touristic areas like airports, and inside specific urban zones to be affected by the diversion of funds away from, and displacement of, indigenous favela and slum communities (e.g. Strange, 2013; Euromonitor, 2013; O’Neill, 2014; BBC, 2015). As a result, strategic task forces of Olympic planners (and ‘pacification’ forces) took hard, physical action against urban dwellers who refused to be displaced – breaking down local resistance efforts (see Talbot’s, 2016 graphic analysis). Yet, somewhat ironically, Rio claimed that:

‘… the Olympic Games should serve the city, rather than the city serving the Games and to be an ‘inclusive’ Games’ (Rio Candidature File, 2009: 9).

Pappalepore and Duignan (2016) argue that such contradictions frequently typify the dichotomy between ‘rhetoric’ and ‘reality’ in mega-events. However, commentators have claimed that there is a significant lack of academic research, and focus on the complex, localised and often idiosyncratic urban impacts on host communities and those voices marginalised at the heart of Olympic zones, specifically during the live staging periods (e.g. McGillivray and Frew, 2015; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). We present the case of Central Greenwich, an officially designated UNESCO World Heritage site and established as one of London’s key touristic sites - home of some of the UK’s leading attractions (e.g. National Maritime Museum, Cutty Sark) according to the Association of Leading Visitor Attractions (ALVA) (2018). The paper contributes by presenting an in-depth, empirically driven analysis of the experiences of one specific small retail and hospitality business community promised a summer of event-tourism trade opportunity, yet found themselves unable to leverage. As a result, we identify how locals resisted against Olympic strategies designed to restrict them from accessing such opportunity. The paper amplifies their narratives, examines through an analysis of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tactics how and why they resisted, and subsequently proposes as series of ‘tactics for resistance’ for future communities to proactively resist and support the effective (re)distribution of event (tourism) benefits (Ziakas, 2014). As a result, we draw on and advance the under-utilised concept of resistance within tourism studies. Specifically, the work of de Certeau (1984) is adopted as a means to theorise local acts of resistance towards the ‘strategies’ of dominant powers in a mega-event tourism context. We suggest there is insight to be gained
by applying concepts of local ‘tactics’ to the Olympics to develop a theory of practice that considers the relationship between local resistance and powerful strategic manoeuvres.

Empirically driven, this paper is guided by three key research questions:

1) What are the reasons behind local acts of small business communal resistance in the ‘live staging’ periods?
2) What are the tactics and resistance mechanisms deployed by small businesses at the host community level?
3) How far are such acts of resistance effective in redistributing event-related benefits and/or in negating challenges?

Structurally, the following sections provide an in-depth analysis of the specific ways host communities, specifically small businesses may find themselves locked-out of event-tourism trade opportunities, and how planning practices often transcend and ignore local interests. We draw on these economic and spatial exclusions as a prelude to explain why host communities have and continue to resist the very presence and execution of mega-events. The literature review shifts to a focus on the concept of resistance, specifically how and why ‘communal resistance’ has materialised in the context of mega-events. Afterwards, we present a detailed methodology, followed by empirical findings and analysis in light of our theoretical frame. We close by concluding key conceptual and practical aspects, managerial and policy implications, and proposed future avenues of research.

2. Economic and spatial exclusions of mega-events

Defined as having a ‘dramatic character’ of ‘international significance’ (Roche, 2000: 1), mega events symbolise and manifest as extraordinary forms of event-led policy. They have been described as an exogenous shock, serving to fast-track urban policy (Faulkner et al., 2001). Catalysing developmental outcomes features as a core objective of all mega-events, and emerges as a key direct - and hoped-for - aspect of achieving a successful urban legacy in the context of London 2012 (House of Lords, 2013). Yet, speeding up development and execution of policy, may serve to transcend everyday consultative [democratic] processes of inclusive and progressive urban governance. Host cities and project actors target places and spaces for specific action under the guise of immediate deadlines and short timescales - swiftly and effectively. Yet, such processes do not always satisfy the short-term interests of host
communities at the epicentre of Games planning - particularly during the ‘live staging’ phases. Evidence points to the way in which mega-events suspend and supersede existing national law, rules and regulations, legal precedence and sovereignty (Siddons, 2012). They effectively render certain local laws obsolete, replacing them with the overarching ‘Host City Contract’ (HCC): off-the-shelf rules and regulations demanded by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Braathen et al. (2016) simply state that ‘Olympic bid books become the de-facto planning documents’ (2016: 262) as power and legitimacy transfer to a new regime of policy makers and project actors. As a result, mega-events effectively create what Agamben (2005) describes as a ‘state of exception’ under the auspices of being in both the local and national interest. Powell and Marrero-Guillamon’s (2012) examination of ‘London’s state of exception’ has been influential in examining how mega-events in general, and specifically to London 2012, have supported the installation of spatial and regulatory controls at the local level – conditions that may serve to exclude host communities from accessing opportunity across heavily securitised – and militarised – event zones, including Greenwich. The exclusion of host communities, across a variety of cases and ways, emerges as a common picture in light of mega-event planning, delivery and even legacy.

Host communities may find themselves excluded from Games planning and delivery in a number of ways. For instance, through the immediate displacement and removal of economically [and politically] vulnerable local stakeholder groups to make way for necessary Olympic-related developments (Raco and Tunney, 2010), right through to a legacy of gentrification and rising rents (commercial and residential) through, for example, increased desirability, marketing of place and infrastructural developments (Vigor et al., 2004; OECD, 2008; Gold and Gold, 2008). Yet, very little academic attention has examined the ways small businesses residing at the heart of Olympic event zones can be excluded during the intense live staging of the Olympics – the temporal focus of this paper. This seems surprising as such projects demand the sequestration of public space, usually owned by those residing at the local level, to fuel the event’s existence – often at the expense of local inclusion (Hall, 2006; Pappalepore and Duignan, 2016). In the period immediately prior to the Opening Ceremony civic spaces (soon-to-be Olympic event zones) are efficiently captured. This act of ‘territorialisation’ (e.g. Raffestin, 1980) is effectively where the ‘project territory’ merges with that of the existing ‘context territory’. Project territory, to some extent, is the production of territory striking an (uneasy) balance between ‘global’, ‘project’ and ‘macro’ needs (e.g. the IOC, sponsors, local sanctioning bodies and the event itself etc.), and ‘local’ needs (e.g. nation,
city, region, locale, community of residents/traders etc). Olympic territorialisation, inasmuch as it can be considered the production of new territory-created ‘striated’ space, interweaves its project requirements within the existing environment: the ‘context territory’.

Spaces earmarked for mega-event led development are thus subject to political moves and power struggles. One of the major issues is that spaces required for Olympic development are often conceptualised as ‘blank slates’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010) ready for ‘wholesale demolition’ (Shin, 2013: 7) with ‘little consideration needed for existing activities and practices’ (Raco and Tunney, 2010: 2087). Raco (2014) and Raco and Tunney (2010), however, suggest that such intervention reflects little understanding of the pre-existing socio-economic practices that permeate across ‘invisible’ host community spaces, and the interconnected networks that localities rely on. Existing academic and policy research currently shows that those who need the changes rarely benefit from them (e.g. Zimbalist, 2015; OECD, 2008). One of the key issues identified is that mega-events often focus on ‘project’ ambitions, prioritising more ‘macro’ and ‘city and nation’ objectives in search of a ‘utilitarian’ vision – thus limited critical analysis focuses on local challenges bestowed at the host community level. It seems that stakeholders are often perceived as existing in low-order suburbs, offering little to the economic vitality of the city, and so interventions regularly ignore the day-to-day socio-economic practices that local communities frequently rely on (Raco and Tunney, 2010). This reflects an ironic situation whereby the very communities who formed the intended beneficiaries of London 2012’s initial bid, and recipients of a virtuous legacy vision, become marginalised. Raco and Tunney (2010) argues that Olympic planning is akin to a

‘… tidal wave crashing over local businesses (…) their low visibility has [in the context of London 2012] made them relatively easy targets for ‘decisive action’’ (2010: 2082).

3. Ignoring the ‘host context’
Effectively, ‘the Olympics allow democracies to behave like dictatorships – if only for a short time’ (Mohdin, 2016: 1) and seldom facilitate any ‘real’ form of democratic consultation (Cashman, 2002). Hiller (2002) argues that, instead of consulting local residents and businesses, project actors often conceive their task as ‘merely informing people about plans rather than truly seeking input about these plans from the ground up’ (2002: 104). A key project strategy is to seek superficial representation from key community gatekeepers, to demonstrate ‘wide community consent’ and pay lip service to those who may oppose delivery to neutralise
threats, avoid dissent and prevent resistance – leading to a continued lack of understanding of local issues and localism (Cashman, 2002). Hiller (1998) claims that such processes are historically rooted in Games delivery, and frequently uses the Calgary 1998 Winter Games as an example of how the Olympics ignores grassroots participation in favour of privileged stakeholder interests (also see Miles, 2010). Limited two-way dialogue, according to Hiller (2002), inevitably leads to a narrow view of stakeholder interests and promotes a somewhat ‘singular’ project discourse that frequently ‘fail[s] to be responsive to wider interests and long-term community needs’ (Mean et al, 2004: 130-131).

Although events frequently seek support from small businesses and other local communities prior to delivery in order to legitimise policy objectives (Foley et al, 2011), the very same stakeholders are often unable to obtain action in response to their concerns, following the ‘principle of who or what really counts’ (Mitchell et al, 1997: 853). Therefore, whilst perspectives are encouraged and sought, local narratives are quickly marginalised as the project becomes ‘real’ (Gilmore, 2014). As identified earlier the ‘overriding’ of local concerns is widely attributed to and justified based on the aforementioned pressures placed on project actors to deliver global projects on time and to budget, often justified as a project in the city and national interest (Smith, 2012). Becker’s (2008) analysis of the Beijing 2008 Games epitomises such regressive, top-down approaches to Olympic policy, planning and delivery, creating severely disadvantaged communities through the need to, for example, create space for Olympic infrastructure. It is therefore unsurprising that commentators (e.g. Raco, 2004) argue that flagship Olympic urban development programmes always promise change, but seldom deliver the type of change promised. This includes macro-policy agenda right through to the introduction and reengineering of urban infrastructure, local spaces and the very socio-economic networks that have been argued to underpin high-functioning and sustainable urban communities (New Economics Foundation, 2010; UK Government, 2013).

Horne and Manzenreiter (2006:18) argue that mega-events often prioritise the ‘interests of global flows rather than local communities’. Specifically, Miles (2010) claims that they serve to appease global consumerist tastes, as opposed to highlighting a cross-section of local interest (and, in the case of small businesses, the ‘local offer’). Yet, the Olympics is a public sector led project. Critics therefore argue that considerable public expenditure favours private, namely multinational, enterprise (Smith, 2012), and general trends toward the commodification of culture have given rise to the increasingly corporatized nature of mega-events (e.g. Tomlinson,
It has been noted by Boykoff (2012) that security affords mega-events, specifically the Olympics the power to colonise and secure official event spaces describing such occasions as form of ‘Celebration Capitalism’. McGillivray and Frew (2015) note that such projects sequestrate national and cultural assets at the heart of these event spaces to commercially exploit them on behalf of external, contingent actors from official sponsors to the IOC themselves. Contrary to the rhetoric, mega-events thrive on exclusivity – from elite sport, elite cultural production, to the commercial logic of ‘brand exclusivity’ within official event zones and across the host city. Mega-events, by virtue of their title, focus on the ‘mega’ over the ‘micro’ (Clark et al, 2016), the ‘external’ (global) over the ‘internal’ (local), which in turn locks out, albeit temporarily, existing small businesses event-tourism trade opportunities. Frew and McGillivray (2008) illustrated the exclusionary effects of exclusive commercial spaces at the 2006 Germany World Cup, and Hall (2006) empirically examined the idiosyncratic exclusionary impacts across the city and resultant protests by small businesses and local business associations. Nicholas Stucke, President of the German Trade Association, cited in Hall (2006), claimed that:

‘… there won’t be any German products on sale in the marketplaces of the towns where the matches are being held … You can get a Coca-Cola, American Beer and McDonalds but that will be it (…) German products will be locked out’ (Hall, 2006: 63).

Although Raco and Tunney (2010) argue that mega-events render local communities invisible and ignore local communities, who lack the political and economic capital – and clout – to resist and amplify narratives of exclusion, a handful of authors, including Hall (2006) and Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), have empirically identified examples of resistance from various ‘host contexts’. Across what can be described as contested Olympic spaces the question of how communities can amplify their voice, promote plurality, and identify specific tactics and lines of flight to ‘creatively resist’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987) and overcome exclusionary spatial conditions remains vital, and not fully resolved, in the pursuit of equable outcomes.

4. Mediated and ‘communal resistance’

In the late 1980s Jackson (1987) expressed concern that the object of resistance was almost invisible, and ‘the geography of resistance is one that surely merits the most urgent consideration’ (1987: 263). By the late 1990s resistance had become a central theme of
contemporary social and cultural geography (Pile and Keith, 1997). However, resistance has been an under-utilised theoretical vehicle despite its value in exploring and understanding the politics of lived spaces and theorising the construction of place (Massey, 1993). For example, in seeking to theorise the social impact of tourism, Eichhorn et al. (2015) claim the concept remains neglected and narrowly applied. Although studies of community and national forms of resistance are growing, few tourism or events studies fully articulate the spectrum of strategies of resistance in the context of the agency of the ‘host’ (Pritchard et al., 2011). Some exceptions include the conceptualisation of community resistance by Doğan (1989) which places it centrally in the tactics of local people, and also Joseph and Kavoori (2001) who adopt the concept of mediated and ‘communal resistance’ to explain the subversive actions of host communities - namely how local people can ‘transform an ambivalent and disempowered relationship into one that is culturally acceptable to the host community’ (2001: 999).

Notably, de Certeau (1984) is credited with examining space as ‘practised place’ i.e. culturally specific, symbolic and grounded in social relations of power and contestation. In defining ‘strategies’ as the purview of power, he theorised places as sites of resistance where opponents or dominant forces can be challenged and excluded. For de Certeau, strategy presumes control and is self-segregating. His work consequently provides a framework that adopts a more critical approach to place. Consequently, in positioning ‘tactics’ as a counter-response to strategies and as the purview of the non-powerful, his theorisation provides a means with which to approach the concepts of resistance towards the ‘strategies’ of hegemonic powers in a mega-event tourism context. There is certainly value in applying concepts of local ‘tactics’ to the Olympics to develop a theory of practice that considers the relationship between local resistance and strategic manoeuvres. It is the ‘socio-culturally mediated capacity to act’ that Ahearns (2001: 112) links directly to forms of resistance, where local people act in their interest and use policy and law to undertake a form of ‘rightful resistance’ (O’Brien and Li, 2006) or ‘creative resistance’, which Deleuze and Guattari (1987) might theorise as ‘rhizomatic multiplicities of interactions, relations and acts of becoming’ (1987: 33).

If, as Eichhorn (2013) argues, ‘resistance can be seen as a counter-mechanism to overcome unequal power structures ... discourses which offer potential sites for resistance’ (2013: 580), evidence of the unequal developmental effects of mega-events provides a fresh empirical context to demonstrate how resistance can become central to local community responses and actions. Critical commentators increasingly question the inherent development and
management challenges communities face, including forced evictions, removal of vulnerable or undesirable stakeholder groups (such as the homeless) and gentrification. The ever-increasing costs of hosting mega-events, usually largely paid for by public funds which are inevitably diverted from other causes, are a common trigger of local resistance. The resonance of anti-Olympic movements within international media and social media have hindered attempts by candidate host cities to ‘manufacture consent’ (Lenskyj, 2008) through control of related media reports. Indeed, lack of public support has led many national Olympic committees to withdraw their bids (Dempsey and Zimbalist, 2017). As a consequence, the number of cities bidding to host the Olympic Games has reduced from nine for the 2012 Games to only two for the 2024 Games. This decline in interest has prompted calls for a new Olympic Games hosting model, such as decentralisation to multiple sites with specialised facilities (Christesen, 2016), rotation between a few established host cities or the development of one permanent site (Short, 2017).

Cottrell and Nelson (2011) conducted an analysis of all contestations, internationally and nationally, occurring in connection with the Games between 1896 and 2008. Their analysis illustrated that protests have not only become more frequent but have grown in their scope and level of professionalization across transnational networks, social movements and cultural contexts, including ‘DemocracyNow’ (2018), GamesMonitor (2018) and RioonWatch (2018) to name a few as rightful forms of resistance. Cottrell and Nelson (2011) note that Olympic sport at the transnational level is continuously politicised and critiqued due to the extraordinary powers invoked by the IOC and respective NOCs, and the emerging prominence of international activist groups. Broudehoux (2015) argues that, alongside physical approaches, the fast and widespread use of mobile technologies and social media platforms contributes to the rapid expansion, internationalisation and global messaging of political activist groups. It also, however, resonates with Roche’s (2000) idea that mega-events play an important role in the formation of collective identities and a global civil society.

Olympic resistance has rarely been theorised, yet protest against the Games’ management and delivery and political activism (which uses the Games as a global platform to raise awareness of non-Olympic related issues) have both been objects of violent repression by host governments terrified of global media scrutiny. The Chinese government, before Beijing 2008, reduced political unrest by appealing to nationalist sentiment and suggesting ‘that embracing the Games was not only a civic duty, but also a contribution to the advancement of the
motherland’ (Broudehoux, 2015:124). In an interesting display of (Olympics-legitimised) suspension of the law Russia banned all demonstrations during the Sochi Winter Games (Boykoff, 2015). Even in more democratic contexts, such as Australia and Canada, protests were silenced or contained during the Games, often through the establishment of ‘authorized protest zones’ (van Luijk and Frisby, 2012). This approach simply applies the Olympic Charter rule which states that ‘no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites or other areas’ (IOC 2007: 98 cited in van Luijk and Frisby, 2012: 344).

Building on Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction (1950), Gotham (2015) argues that, whilst top-down mega-events autocratically impose and determine relations and outcomes within the space they territorialise, they can be transformed via bottom-up grassroots contestation and resistance across platforms where actors compete ‘for access to and control over material and cultural resources’ (Gotham, 2015: 33). We use the case of London 2012 to examine and extend current thinking on how and why communities resist, and negate challenges brought to bear by overlaying complex project demands into local environments. As the mask of Olympic hegemony continues to reveal itself with respect to unequal developmental outcomes, civic resistance remains as strident as ever against the mere question of hosting, serving to thwart quests by governments to achieve mega-event led development. The upper echelons of sport governance may wish to reflect on this untenable situation, as the longer-term survival of the Olympic movement, project and mega-event is under question.

5. Methodology

Local communities are faced with challenges which are both complex and idiosyncratic to each host context; however, narratives of exclusion are seldom amplified. As a result, we selected an inductive, in-depth, qualitative case study design (Yin, 2013) rooted within a subjectivist ontological and epistemological paradigm (e.g. Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Our approach aimed to amplify local perspectives and community narratives, and examine exclusion and resistance within a specific geographical context, naturally sitting in a critical theorist position. Characterised by a ‘single’ narrow frame and ‘embedded’ analysis of multiple stakeholder perspectives (Wilson, 2014), and empirically driven, we focus on one host community and the retrospective experiences of small businesses which became significantly [negatively] impacted in the lead up to and live staging of the London 2012 Games (25 July – 12 August,
We examined the World Heritage UNESCO site of Central Greenwich, the official site of Olympic equestrian events that took part on the grounds of the royal Greenwich Park. This area was one of six East London boroughs (municipalities) officially designated to house official event zones. Central Greenwich is a densely populated area with a vibrant town centre, home to world-class tourist attractions with a close-knit retail and hospitality business community. It represented an interesting case as it was subject to significant controversy in relation to the decision to withdraw Greenwich Park green space from general use by the public for an extended period of time to stage live events (e.g. Smith, 2013).

Primary data in this paper is based on the qualitative analysis of 43 in-depth interviews. Four groups of stakeholders (Tables 1 and 2) were involved: i) small retail and hospitality businesses (SG1), ii) local authorities and business engagement officers (SG2), iii) business support (e.g. London Chamber of Commerce, Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)) (SG3), and iv) other regional and national level governmental bodies (e.g. Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS), House of Lords) (SG4). The primary data was generated between 2013 and 2014 as part of a PhD thesis [reference hidden for blind peer review] and re-analysed by all authors against the paper’s specific research questions. Research participants were selected through a combination of purposive and snowballing non-probability sampling techniques according to specific selection criteria including geographic location, specific knowledge and experience of the phenomenon being studied, and direct involvement with the planning and/or delivery of the Games. The experiences of small retail and hospitality businesses (SG1) are triangulated alongside the perspectives of three other stakeholder groups (SG 2, 3 and 4). Four specific gatekeepers were chosen across the four stakeholder groups:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder group, gatekeeper alias and interviewee number</th>
<th>Chosen key gatekeeper and justification</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholder group 1 - Local F&amp;B firm, Owner (Interviewee #24)</strong></td>
<td>Vocal local resister of the Olympics, identified through secondary reports and via Twitter. Introduced local businesses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stakeholder group 2 - Greenwich Council, Business Engagement Officer (Interviewee #19)</strong></td>
<td>Provided local information from local authority perspective on issues within Central Greenwich, and introduced other official Olympic borough local authorities.</td>
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</table>
**Stakeholder group 3** - Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), Senior Policy Advisor (Interviewee #12)

Co-author of critical post-Games report on business challenges that mimicked similar challenges for Central Greenwich, and introduced other participants.

**Stakeholder group 4** - British Olympic Association (BOA), Senior Manager (Interviewee #6)

Major actor in the bidding/planning of London 2012, with experience of working with communities. Provided introductions to high level Olympic sport management and UK Government.

### Table 1 – Key gatekeepers chosen

Secondary research published between 2004 and 2013 was used to ensure familiarity with Greenwich, alongside the wider macro-environment, and to corroborate the primary data. These sources include: i) official London 2012 project and policy documentation, ii) archival material from both the House of Commons and the House of Lords HC Hansard records of debates and reports, and iii) supplementation by a range of relevant media sources, including broadcast, tabloid, regional and national articles.

The descriptive validity of the results (Maxwell, 1992) was enhanced through methodological triangulation (Yin, 2013), which involved data triangulation, stakeholder triangulation and investigator triangulation (as all authors contributed to the empirical analysis). Textual data was coded using NVivo10, and all authors independently examined empirical and secondary data and generated themes using Attride-Stirling’s (2001) Thematic Networks Analysis (TNA) approach. The authors then amalgamated themes and agreed the final line of argumentation and structure of analysis. These include: i) spatial and regulatory exclusion, ii) local narratives of marginalisation, anger and disappointment, and iii) ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ resistance tactics.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Stakeholder group</strong></th>
<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stakeholder group 1 (SG 1)</td>
<td>Small local firms in Central Greenwich’s ‘Last Mile’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Stakeholder group 2 (SG2)  Business engagement officers across official Olympic host boroughs.

Stakeholder group 3 (SG3)  Business organisations responsible for the welfare of small local businesses around Olympic host boroughs.

Stakeholder group 4 (SG4)  High level project actors, key stakeholders who have direct or indirect involvement in the planning, delivering or lobbying of the Games.

Table 2 - Breakdown of research stakeholder groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee alias</th>
<th>Organisation and role</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee #1 (SG4)</td>
<td>House of Lords, Senior Lord</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interviewee #2 (SG4)</td>
<td>Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), Senior Manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewee #3 (SG4)</td>
<td>London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), Senior Manager</td>
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Table 3 - List of interviewees

6. Findings and discussions

6.1 Community narratives of exclusion, disappointment and anger

Opportunities for small local businesses located in Olympic event zones were presented ahead of the Games, both at policy (e.g. Royal Borough of Greenwich, 2012) and industry (e.g. ETOA, 2005) level. Local retail and food outlets were encouraged to invest in extra stock, refurbishments and seasonal staff to prepare for the ‘once in a generation opportunity to have local businesses on a world stage’ (Interviewee #21 (SG2)). Qualitative evidence suggests investments mostly proved to be an unnecessary waste of resources, and the promised ‘bonanza’ (Interviewee #29 (SG1)) failed to materialise, leading to feelings of deception, discontent and anger. A range of factors contributed to the lack of positive short-term positive impacts for local businesses that led to subsequent communal resistance attempts against London’s Olympic project.

Our analysis reveals that extraordinary local and city-wide security measures associated with fears of terrorism and public safety led to an effective transformation of public space and to the diversion of Olympic and non-Olympic related footfall through barricades, signage and marshalling. Describing event sites in lock-down, the BBC (2012c) at the time reported that ‘it was like being in the inner cordon of a crime scene’. As identified in the review Central Greenwich and beyond epitomised the type of zero-tolerance policing and heavy securitisation and militarisation effects that typify Olympic states of exception. Vice’s (2012) empirical analysis illustrated these very conditions, indicating anti-aircraft missiles on apartment blocks, shockwave devices with the capacity to immobilise and disable crowds of people, helicopter carriers stationed close by on the Thames, and over 49,000 military personnel and 500 FBI agents mingling amongst the crowds. From Central Greenwich to the Olympic park event zones became effectively sealed off Olympic bubbles, transformed and protected by military zones and airport-style security measures.
Local perspectives from Central Greenwich repeatedly used a range of sci-fi and political metaphors to describe the Olympics and reflect on securitised conditions. For example, they described Games planning as an ‘alien beast’ that did not ‘interact’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)), a ‘self-contained satellite’ protected by a ‘forcefield’ (Interviewee #37 (SG1)), and as being like the ‘Gestapo had landed in Greenwich’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). Local government announcements ahead of the Games requested locals, workers and tourists to avoid Central London and Host Event Zones to avoid overcrowding. This was noted by Pappalepore and Duignan (2016), who claimed that: ‘in the preceding weeks London’s mayor, Boris Johnson, ran a campaign inviting people not attending the sporting events to avoid Central London and the Olympic Zones unless strictly necessary’ (2016: 350). These sentiments were echoed by small businesses interviewed by the BBC (2012c) claiming that narratives of fear ‘poisoned people’s minds with terrorism, traffic (…) I have never seen a July as bad as this ever’. One small business remarked that:

‘…we could have easily had a game of 5-a-side football and we would not have been in the way of cars, pedestrians or anything – it was dead!’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)).

Image 1 – Barricaded routes across Central Greenwich (Author images).

As noted by Smith (2013), we found that the privatisation or closure of public spaces such as Greenwich Park and tourist attractions (e.g. the Royal Observatory) angered local people. Respondents argued that businesses normally benefit from visitor footfall but ‘Greenwich Park was closed for three months before the Olympics so all the people who come to Greenwich just to the park, which is one of the main royal parks in London, and it was pretty much shut down for the spring. So we lost a lot of visitors to Greenwich’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). Also, ‘Greenwich Park closed weeks before the Games started which impacted the number of visitors coming in to Greenwich’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)). Furthermore, the IOC’s strict regulations aimed at safeguarding sponsors, including restrictions on the use of Olympic-related keywords
and symbols, and on the products that can be sold on site (UK Government, 2013), served to preclude any form of effective leveraging by local small businesses.

Repeatedly, sentiments were shared not only across small businesses, but across business support organisations, wider policy and media reports. One respondent claimed: ‘how do you get some of that magic Olympic dust to rub off on your small business? You couldn’t even talk about Olympic kebabs. The Olympics is ‘highly controlled’ and ‘that’s [local regulation] crazy, we all have the freedom of speech but we are bound by the five [Olympic] rings’ (Interviewee #8 (SG3)). Media reports echoed such conditions arguing that the Games turned into ‘what many legal experts consider to be the most stringent restrictions ever put in place to protect sponsors’ brands’ (The Guardian, 2012), leading to a critical BBC (2011) conclusion that ‘they [existing small businesses across local communities and/or within existing Games venues] may just have to sit out these Games on the side-lines’. Later in the report Pierre Williams, a spokesperson for the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB), stated that ‘LOCOG’s almost absurd overzealousness in protecting corporate sponsors from threats that frankly do not exist has further weakened small businesses’ views of the Games and the opportunities it would bring’ (BBC, 2011). Repeatedly, this view was echoed by small businesses:

‘Consequences of this walking route and barrier from the station was absolutely deadly for business’ (…) 50,000 people were managed into the venue and out again without having any ripple on the local area (…) it was devastatingly quiet, all you could see was the shop owners looking’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)).

The combination of these factors led to, according to the evidence collected, a challenging outcome for small local businesses during the peak tourism summer season of 2012 across Central Greenwich. Feelings of exclusion, and narratives of disappointment and anger, resulted in acts of resistance by the local business community and fuelled a series of what de Certeau (1984) might have conceptualised as deterritorialisation ‘tactics’ to emancipate and circumvent strategies put in place to manage spaces. Although resistance attempts were found prior to the Games in protest against the closure of Greenwich Park (see Smith, 2013, and selection of images below), during the live staging phases a series of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ tactics was invoked.
6.2 Hard resistance tactics: physical action and dismantling the barricades

Interviewees commented on the ‘heavy handed’ and ‘over planned’ nature of security (Interviewee #25 (SG1)) and ‘fortified’ public space (Interviewee #29 (SG1)). Although a senior manager in the Royal Borough Council illustrated the ‘unbelievable job’ TFL executed, he also claimed that controls were simply ‘a bit too strong in places’ (Interviewee #22 (SG2)). Similarly, a senior policy advisor at the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) claimed that small firms were ‘not getting enough footfall into local areas due to LOCOG mismanagement in places’ (Interviewee #12 (SG3)). Local businesses also noted how event organisers ‘wanted them [attendees] in as quickly as possible into their events and out as quickly as possible – they didn’t want them milling around at all’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). Respondents described the flow of visitors as being ‘manhandled’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)), ‘brainwashed’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)), ‘treated like cattle’, ‘sheep’ and ‘idiots’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). They also talked about ‘physically marshalling’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)) footfall and ‘bullying’ the public to go ‘their way’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). From local small business to policy perspectives, one respondent from the FSB claimed that the flow of event visitors was akin to a ‘ghost train’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)) where visitors were ‘put in to a narrow band and then ushered down Church Street’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). Then, after the live events, ‘they [event visitors] came out and they had no opportunity for anything, they were being shoehorned like small school children’ (Interviewee #24 (SG1)). The findings reveal that visitors were unable to leave striated spaces and were actively discouraged from engaging with the locale.
Several locals further questioned why the Olympics created an extended elongated route diverting visitors through demarcated zones toward airport style security zones. Claiming these spatial arrangements made no sense, small firms noted ‘...It did not seem to make any logical sense as to why they have funnelled everyone (...) it is just weird why they are walking all the way round’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). These sentiments repeatedly echoed across the community. Although perhaps justified by legitimate terrorism-related security imperatives, the overarching view was that host space was simply too controlled and unnecessary: ‘they don't need to [have the barriers] (...) why have we spent money hiring these blocks?’ (Interviewee #26 (SG1)). As a result, the most visible resistance was therefore physical action, as according to one small business ‘... I took it [security planning] as positive aggression against our shops on the route’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)). Interviewees explained how ‘some people were so pissed off that they actually manhandled the barriers themselves’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)), and that ‘during the Games they considered handcuffing themselves to the barricades, that’s why they panicked and we had to have publicity. Most of the restaurants and the people at the market got together!’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)).

‘... they [organised community of protesting businesses on the Greenwich Island] complained and they took them down. Three days later they took down the barrier’ (Interviewee #27 (SG1)).

Disappointed and angry with local conditions well into the live staging of the Games, individuals ‘took it upon themselves to dismantle the barrier and put some signs up to welcome people in (...) as these people were just trying to change something’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)). Such tactics, alongside organised protests, served as a key method of removing physical restrictions from their community in order to stimulate greater local spend across local businesses. Repeatedly, small businesses illustrated numerous reactive approaches taken:

‘It got to the point that we got so furious that we went out into the street and try to talk to the stewards and to say this is really unfair and to actually try to direct people, we put up a big sign with there is a market here, come through the market’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)).

Empirical analysis further revealed how Central Greenwich saw new temporary pop-up ventures (officially sanctioned by the Olympics) set up shop within metres of fixed, permanent
business units (SG1). Respondents argued that these external contingent actors related to the Games played a major role in displacing the consumption of existing fixed business units operating within Central Greenwich. Resistance attempts to remove these temporary non-local businesses ensued, with a high degree of success according to several interviewees. However, many suggested the action was too little - too late, and commercial harm had already been done as a result of this, as well as limited access to event visitors and Olympic trading opportunities.

‘…there were a number of pop-up coffee shops and it was out of towners who made a killing. We all suffered. There were food and cake stalls in front of their restaurants selling food. Then [we] went out and moved them’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)).

The final dominant theme related to ‘hard’ tactics included direct conflicts between local businesses and event volunteers - formally referred to as ‘Games Makers’. Respondents shared stories of how small firms actively confronted these actors to alter their marshalling behaviour, which included blowing their whistles and directing visitors past the doors of local businesses, standing in front of shop windows and closing off local traders from spectators’ view. One small business recalled, ‘it got to the point that we got so furious that we went out and tried to talk to the stewards to say this is really unfair’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). Others argued the problems became such that, in order to negate the corralling of visitors, business owners used offensive verbal language and came close to physical action against Games Makers situated immediately outside their stores.

‘There was a gentleman down here, now out of business, and he actually went out and try to … the Olympics had to fight him because they wanted to put a board over his shop, they wouldn’t let anyone over the barrier to go into his shop – even when people were asking to go in. He said ‘you have to let them into my shop!’ – they [the marshals] actually had to restrain him – he was in all the papers and made local headlines, they held him back, and he had to get someone to remove them from his doorway!’ (Interviewee #38 (SG1)).

Locally employed tactics to deterriorialise were clearly visible, although our findings illustrate that exclusion and action was often met with zero tolerance and physical restraint afforded through extraordinary legal and regulatory conditions within London’s Olympic state of exception (Powell and Marrero-Guillamon, 2012). This relationship between imposed
conditions and the employment of tactics to resist dominant power structures seems to offer fresh scope for critical theoretical development of what de Certeau and indeed Soja (1996:87) may regard as demonstrating ‘community, resistance and emancipatory change’. Strategies imposed by the project clashed with the local tactics required to circumvent determined topologies to access opportunities that had been initially promised. As identified earlier, de Certeau (1984) is often credited with examining space as ‘practised place’, i.e. culturally specific, symbolic and grounded in social relations of power and contestation. In defining ‘strategies’ as creating places as sites of resistance where opponents or dominant forces can be challenged and excluded he demonstrates the value in work that adopts a more critical approach. There is certainly value in taking de Certeau’s work out of its original context (urban navigation) and applying it to the Olympics to develop an alternative theory of practice that considers the relationship of resistance to strategic mega-event manoeuvres. Clearly, in this context, albeit successful in places, reactive action and creative tactics emerged too little - too late to fully realise event-tourism trade opportunities induced by the coming of the Games – a dominant finding of this paper.

6.4 Softer tactics: lobbying, publicising and politicising local exclusion

Our findings identify how local stakeholders complemented physical and ‘hard’ forms of creative resistance efforts with the use of softer forms of resistance tactics. In a communal resistance effort a collective organisation of small businesses lobbied the local council (the Royal Borough of Greenwich), local members of parliament (MPs) and the NOC: the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG). Although this was after the event small businesses further contributed exclusionary case studies to key national small business impact reports arising from the Games, including the Federation of Small Business’ (2013) ‘Passing the Baton’ report and the London Chamber of Commerce’s (2012) analysis entitled ‘Small Businesses and the London 2012 Olympics’. One small business owner who led local lobbying claimed that ‘once this [barricading and marshalling] started to happen we collectively lobbied our local council and MPs and just tried to change some of the behaviours of the marshals’ (Interviewee #23 (SG1)).

Local authority perspectives (including from a Senior Business Engagement Manager at the Royal Borough if Greenwich), claimed that in response ‘the leader of the council got involved and changed those requirements to spill over and to cross the streets, to not so aggressively
barricade or corral/channel visitors to the park’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). Later on the same interviewee described how the local authority was actually on the side of local businesses – both embattled against the determining force of spatial and regulatory controls enforced by the Olympic project, claiming that they were trying resist stringent LOCOG, Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) and Transport for London (TFL) planning demands, which were instrumental in orchestrating the aforementioned exclusionary environments. They claimed that ‘prior to the Olympics the council tried vociferously to make sure that LOCOG and ODA requirements were controlled and held back to some extent and to compromise for those regulations did not have an impact on businesses’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). They also stated that initial proposals were ‘truly horrifying’ in terms of ‘loss of parking space and transport flows…’ and thus claimed the council ‘pushed back quite aggressively, against what the [initial] requirements were’ (Interviewee #19 (SG2)). However, despite collaborative and separate local efforts by both local businesses and authorities they both remained relatively hand-tied, impotent and limited in their agency to resist against Olympic planning. Cashman and Hughes (1999) examined similar challenges in the case of Sydney 2000, stating that even local authorities received ‘very little information on key issues like anticipated transport flows that are often vital for the formulation of local transport plans’ (1999: 32). It is therefore no wonder that Flyvbjerg and Bruzelius (2002) subsequently claim that there is little evidence that local actors - particularly small enterprises - have ever significantly influenced the objectives of high-profile mega-event projects.

‘There was a lot of lobbying going on and fights (...) we got on BBC News and it was just Greenwich is a complete joke. Anyway, then the council had to have meetings with LOCOG about trying to relax their barrier policy (...). So, finally, there was breaks in the barriers that somebody who was very determined could scoot out from the odd little break if they saw it, to be able to cross the road’ (Interviewee #15 (SG3)).

In light of Raco and Tunney’s (2010) argument that local communities remain invisible and depoliticised, small businesses in Central Greenwich turned to regional and national media to amplify their struggle. The findings reveal that during the physical hard tactics taken against spatial controls and visitor movement locals invited London and national media (e.g. BBC. 2012a, 2012b) to witness – and thus comment on exclusionary conditions. One small firm noted, ‘so many people were out there demonstrating. Then [a local actor] got in touch with the ITV and BBC and that’s when it was on the telly’ (Interviewee #28 (SG1)). Tactics to
politicise spatial controls proved to be effective in influencing Olympic planning during the live event phases, as illustrated by our analysis of several media reports during that time (e.g. BBC, 2012a, 2012b, ), and as also confirmed by our interviewees. Firstly, merely the act of publicising Central Greenwich on TV proved useful in attracting visitors to the area as ‘Olympic tourists returned and investigated the area after seeing it on TV’ (Interviewee #43 (SG1)). However, as hoped for, this tactic appeared to be the most effective in terms of transforming local spatial arrangements in favour of local business inclusion.

‘…the BBC and the ITV did some news reporting and then after that the barriers came down – but it was only made possible by the media getting involved – but it was too late by then!’ (Interviewee #33 (SG1)).

Although resistance attempts achieved part-success in relaxing controls and opening up more opportunity for local businesses to secure event-tourism trade opportunity, it was noted by some that the damage had already been done. In other words, locals were caught on the defensive and could only respond reactively. One interviewee remarked ‘...although after a few days we managed to get the council to take down some of the barriers - it decimated our summer really’ (Interviewee #25 (SG1)). This sentiment was echoed by another explaining that the ‘Council realised that they had made a big mistake and rectified it [the local controls] – but it was a bit too late!’ (Interviewee #34 (SG1)). This case illustrates the need for proactive - as opposed to reactive - resistance tactics. Our final conclusion section consolidates ideas calling for proactive ‘tactics for resistance’, that are both conceptually and empirically informed, to offer tactical-managerial ideas for host communities, specifically small businesses to resist project strategies that may preclude access to event-tourism trade opportunities promised at the local level and used to legitimise the project in the first place.

7. Conclusions

Spatial and regulatory controls, as a result of Games territorialisation of Central Greenwich’s context territory, served to fuel narratives of disappointment and anger across contested touristic-event spaces. The paper unpacks both how and why small businesses caught at the epicentre of exclusionary local planning engaged in ‘rightful resistance’ (O’Brien and Li, 2006) and used ‘creative’ and ‘communal’ tactics against the perceived social injustices of London’s Olympic project.
As a result, we unearth practical and actionable tactics that local communities may wish to use to resist in the context of similar conditions that may arise in the planning and execution of future mega-events. Differentiation of management techniques into ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ categories (Ling Kuo, 2002) has been well theorised, where ‘hard’ involves the physical management and regulatory management of visitors, as opposed to ‘soft’ approaches which use education and interpretation (Mason 2005). In furthering and advancing such theorisations, it seems local responses to mega-events can be similarly categorised, where (counter) tactics by local residents fall into the spheres of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ – as illustrated in the findings, where residents imposed almost ‘mirror’ strategies in their responses. Our empirical findings identified a series of hard (physical) and soft (influencing) approaches to stimulate change. Although Vigor et al. (2004) argue that mega-events entail a series of conflicting narratives and stakeholder interests, this case illustrates a joined-up communal effort to stand united to amplify their voice, and change their fortunes to access mega-event-tourism trade opportunities. The planned creation of positive impacts and legacies for host communities (as opposed to more ad-hoc, serendipitous post-event impacts) should be viewed as a tool with which to ‘enable positive social change, rectify power imbalances and decrease inequalities’ (Ziakas, 2014: 9).

This empirically-rich paper provides one of the first studies to both identify and present local responses to tourism mega-events within a conceptual framework of ‘tactics’ informed by both de Certeau (1984) and wider theories of resistance. Firstly, a key ‘softer’ resistance tactic outlined the efficacy of lobbying and working closely with local authorities, policy and governmental actors and event managers to remove physical restrictions, like barriers and marshals that serve to exclude local small business access to mega-event visitor economies and related trading opportunities. Related to evidence of external, opportunist micro-pop up commercial interests operating within local environments, lobbying local and national organisations emerges as vital with regard to protecting commercial spaces where existing small businesses operate. If not, as evidenced by this case, outside businesses can soak up event visitor engagement and consumption at the expense of engagement with local hospitality and retail businesses. Furthermore, small businesses, in a ‘soft’ tactical pincer move, publicised and politicised exclusion and local challenges via mobilising the media.

‘Harder’ tactics to combat immediate physical exclusion served to complement softer approaches. Direct targeted dismantling proved to be the most overt – and desperate - resistance
tactic invoked, alongside local skirmishes between small businesses and Games Makers perceived to be responsible for aggressively marshalling behaviour – seen as a key barrier to accessing local businesses and shops. We identified how small businesses, as a result of spatial changes, took steps to re-think flows of visitors back into the community through erecting wayfinding signage. Yet, we should clarify that it is important to note that in future mega-event scenarios tactics are to be considered in conjunction with localised and official Games guidance – to account for contextual differences across host cities. It can be understood that, through small firm engagement with these proposed activities, the paper promotes rhizomatic activity that open up ‘third spaces’ where small firms identify lines of flight that permit emancipatory outcomes, escape the ‘comfortable certainty of planning’ (Pavoni, 2010: 11) and devise spaces of uncertainty where territorialising tendencies are less effective, and alternative narratives can flourish alongside the event itself.

Yet, although some aspects of local resistance emerge partially-successful - for example the politicisation of their plight through national media, the subsequent relaxation of barriers and marshalling, and the removal of pop up stalls – much of the damage appeared to be already done. Central Greenwich’s host community of small businesses emerged on the back foot, caught in a rear-guard action. This research has shown that de Certeau’s concept of ‘strategies’ provides us with a lens for the future to identify and isolate exclusionary project practices before they manifest and marginalise. This is particularly vital and useful in the context of large-scale urban projects like mega-events as they frequently disserve local communities through inducing exclusionary environments via the installation of ‘off the shelf’ legally backed spatial and regulatory controls. As a result, to some degree, mega-events reliably create exclusionary environments, providing host communities and local authorities responsible for their welfare with the power to predict – and prepare for – the inevitabilities of being marginalised.

This paper argues that proactivity, as opposed to reactivity may be central for transforming the fortunes of host communities, specifically small businesses, who may find themselves in similar challenging situations. By doing so may help support more equitable outcomes from mega-events. We argue this is forms a key managerial and policy implication for tourism stakeholders (especially those residing in well-established tourism contexts like Central Greenwich) who may wish to balance both local small business benefits who play a key permanent role in servicing visitor economies, and temporary external, contingent event
interests like the IOC and official sponsors. Considering this, and utilising examples of ‘tactics for resistance’, communities may wish to equip themselves with tactics to resist large-scale, autocratic, top-down mega-event projects with a history of marginalising existing host community stakeholders and poorly consulting with small businesses in any sort of meaningful way.

Although some of the evidence presented suggests sparks of proactivity on behalf of the local community we argue that proactive tactics to include host community stakeholders should be undertaken by all four stakeholder groups who partook in interviews for this paper (namely, local authorities, business support organisations, policy and government, and project and sports management stakeholders). Joined up thinking across all these groups, and the recognition that local communities may often find themselves excluded, is vital in re-thinking the spatial planning required to stage sports events within newly territorialised Olympic venue areas at the heart of neighbouring communities. We argue that by doing so may provide more inclusive leveraging strategies at the local level. This is an explicit research aim of this paper, and is important in light of Taylor’s (2007) concern that local communities are often reactive to early bid, planning and delivery phases, responding to perceived direct threat, as opposed to being proactive.

Echoing the work of Horne and Manzenreiter (2006), who argue that mega-events can contribute to the ‘naturalisation of social inequalities’ (2006: 18), we have suggested that powerful event-organising institutions are often dominating consciousness, determining action, producing and reproducing society through project-particular ideology in the context of the event spaces. However, as project practices become exposed and communities resist – as evidenced here, and continually found in other mega-event contexts – we argue that the legitimacy and allure of the Olympic movement, project and mega-event is under scrutiny and question as we move further into the 21st century. The soft and hard ‘tactics’ articulated in this paper serve to provide a practical translation of alternative engagement between mega-event governance structures and policy, and local communities. Through local resistance and pressure on mega-events to balance interests, such projects may be able to avoid another ‘summer of discontent’ during what should have been a celebration of sport, and an engine for promoting international peace, tolerance and understanding.

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